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Abstract
We provide a characterization of the set of real-valued functions
that can be the value function of some polynomial game. Specifically,
we prove that a function u : R → R is the value function of some
polynomial game if and only if u is a continuous piecewise rational
function.
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1 Introduction
A polynomial game1 is a strategic-form game whose payoffs are polynomials
in a parameter Z. The value of the two-player zero-sum polynomial game
depends on the value of Z, and therefore it is a function u : R → R. Since
the value of a two-player zero-sum strategic-form game with finitely many
strategies is a solution of a set of linear inequalities (see, e.g., Shapley and
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and #722/18, and NSFC-ISF Grant #2510/17. We thank Francesca Acquistapace, Fab-
rizio Broglia, Jose´ Galva´n, Ehud Lehrer, and Omri Solan for useful discussions.
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1Dresher, Karlin, and Shapley (1950) studied a related class of games that they termed
polynomial games ; those are two-player zero-sum strategic-form games in which the action
set of each player is [0, 1] and the payoff function is polynomial in x and y, where x ∈ [0, 1]
is the mixed action chosen by Player 1 and y ∈ [0, 1] is the mixed action chosen by Player 2.
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Snow (1950)), it follows that the value function u is a continuous and piece-
wise rational function; that is, one can divide the real line R into finitely
many intervals such that the function u is a rational function on each piece.
In this note we show that the converse also holds: every continuous and
piecewise rational function is the value function of some polynomial game.
Characterizing the collection of value functions of a given model has sev-
eral reasons. First, the richness of the set of value functions indicates the
complexity of the model, and allows us to compare models that seem un-
related. Second, each restriction that the value function must satisfy arises
from some aspect(s) in the model, hence increases our understanding of the
model. Third, sometimes we are given the value for some parameters, and
we would like to estimate the value for other parameters. Once we identify
the set of possible value functions of the model, we know how many data
points we need to estimate the value function for new parameters. Fourth,
sometimes we are given the value function for some parameters, yet we do
not completely know the underlying model. The characterization of the set
of value functions may allow us to rule out possible models or increase our
confidence in a prospective model.
The note is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and
main result, in Section 3 we provide the proof of the main result, and in
Section 4 we discuss extensions of the main result.
2 The Model and the Main Result
Definition 2.1 A two-player zero-sum polynomial game is a tuple Γ =
(A,B,G), where
• A is the finite strategy set of Player 1,
• B is the finite strategy set of Player 2,
• G = ((Ga,b)a∈A,b∈B) is the payoff matrix of size |A|× |B|, whose entries
are polynomials in Z.
For every z ∈ R, denote by Γ(z) = (A,B,G(z)) the two-player zero-sum
strategic-form game where the sets of strategies of the two players are A
and B respectively, and the payoffs are G(z) = (Ga,b(z))a∈A,b∈B), that is,
the payoffs in Γ evaluated at Z = z. Denote by u(z) := val(Γ(z)) the value
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of the game Γ(z). The function u : R → R is the value function of the
polynomial game Γ. Denote by V the set of all real-valued functions that are
value functions of some polynomial game Γ.
Definition 2.2 A function u : R → R is piecewise rational if there are a
natural number K ∈ N and a sequence −∞ = h1 < h2 < · · · < hK = ∞,
and rational functions (Qk
Rk
)K−1k=1 such that
2
u =
K−1∑
k=1
1(hk,hk+1]
Qk
Rk
.
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 2.3 The set V coincides with the set of all continuous and piece-
wise rational functions from R to R.
3 Proofs
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.3. We start with the
following simple properties of the set V.
Proposition 3.1 Let u, w ∈ V. Then
(A.1) −u ∈ V.
(A.2) cu ∈ V for every c > 0.
(A.3) u+ w ∈ V.
(A.4) max{u, w} ∈ V.
(A.5) If there is ε > 0 such that u(z) ≥ ε for every z ∈ R, then 1
u
∈ V.
(A.6) If there is z0 ∈ R such that u(z0) = w(z0) then the function v : R→ R
that is defined by
v(z) := 1z≤z0u(z) + 1z>z0w(z)
is in V.
2To simplify notation, in the equation below, for k = K − 1 we write (hK−1, hK ] and
not (hK−1, hK).
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(A.7) u · w ∈ V.
Proof. Since u, w ∈ V, there exist games Γu = (Au, Bu, Gu) and Γw =
(Aw, Bw, Gw) such that u is the value function of Γu and w is the value
function of Γw.
By changing the role of the two players, the value of the game is multiplied
by −1. Formally, the value of the game (Bu, Au, (−Gu)
T ) is minus the value
of the game (Au, Bu, Gu). Statement (A.1) follows.
By multiplying all entries of the matrix by the same positive constant
c, the value of the game is multiplied by c. It follows that Statement (A.2)
holds as well.
To see that Statement (A.3) holds, suppose that the two players simulta-
neously play the games Γu and Γw, and the payoff is the sum of the payoffs
in the two games. Formally, we consider the game Γ = (A,B,G) where A =
Au × Aw, B = Bu × Bw, and G(au,aw),(bu,bw) = Gu(au, bu) + Gw(aw, bw). The
reader can verify that for every z ∈ R, val (Γ(z)) = val (Γu(z))+val (Γw(z)).
To see that Statement (A.4) holds, suppose again that the two players
simultaneously play the games Γu and Γw, and, when choosing his strate-
gies in the two games, Player 1 also chooses whether the payoff will be the
payoff in Γu or in Γw. Formally, we consider the game Γ = (A,B,G) where
A = Au × Aw × {U,W}, B = Bu × Bw, G(au,aw,U),(bu,bw) = Gu(au, bu), and
G(au,aw,W ),(bu,bw) = Gw(aw, bw). The reader can verify that for every z ∈ R,
val (Γ(z)) = max{val (Γu(z)), val (Γw(z))}.
We turn to prove that Statement (A.5) holds. Let Γ = (A,B,G) be the
game where A = {1} ∪ Au, B = {1} ∪ Bu, and
G =
{
ε 01×|Bu|
0|Au|×1 Gu − ε
|Au|×|Bu|
}
,
where 01×|Bu| and 0|Au|×1 are matrices of sizes 1× |Bu| and |Au| × 1 all of
whose elements are 0, and ε|Au|×|Bu| is the matrix of size |Au| × |Bu| all of
whose elements are ε. The value of the strategic-form game (Au, Bu, Gu(z)−
ε
|A|×|B|) is u(z) − ε, which is positive. Since ε > 0, it follows that the
value of the strategic-form game (A,B,G(z)) is the same as the value of the
strategic-form 2× 2 game {
ε 0
0 u(z)− ε
}
,
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which is ε(u(z)−ε)
u(z)
= ε− ε
2
u
. The result follows from Statements (A.1)–(A.3).
We next prove that Statement (A.6) holds. We note that for every two
rational functions û, ŵ : R → R such that û(0) = ŵ(0) = 0 there are c > 0
and N ∈ N sufficiently large such that û(z) ≥ cz + z2N+1 for every z ≤ 0,
and ŵ(z) ≤ cz + z2N+1 for every z ≥ 0. This implies that there are two
polynomials P,Q : R→ R such that
• u(z) ≥ P (z) for every z ≤ z0, and u(z), w(z) ≤ P (z) for every z ≥ z0.
• u(z), w(z) ≤ Q(z) for every z ≤ z0, and w(z) ≥ Q(z) for every z ≥ z0.
Since v = min{max{u, P},max{w,Q}}, the claim follows by Statements (A.1)
and (A.4).
We finally prove that Statement (A.7) holds. Since u, w ∈ V, both these
functions are piecewise rational. Hence, there exist a natural number K ∈ N
and a sequence −∞ = h1 < h2 < · · · < hK = ∞ such that the sign of both
u and w is the same over each interval (hk, hk+1), for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K − 1}.
Let Γ = (A,B,G) be the polynomial game in which the two players si-
multaneously play the games Γu and Γw, and the payoff is the product of
the payoffs in the two games. Formally, A = Au × Aw, B = Bu × Bw,
and G(au,aw),(bu,bw) = Gu(au, bu) · Gw(aw, bw). Since the expectation of the
product of two independent random variables is the product of the expec-
tations, it follows that if z is such that both u(z) ≥ 0 and w(z) ≥ 0,
then val (Γ(z)) = val (Γu(z)) · val (Γw(z)). By multiplying each of the
functions u and w by −1, and by using Statement (A.1), we deduce that
for every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K − 1} there is3 a polynomial game Γk such that
val (Γk(z)) = val (Γu(z)) · val (Γw(z)) for every z ∈ (hk, hk+1). This, to-
gether with an inductive argument and Statement (A.6), implies that State-
ment (A.7) holds.
We now have the tools to prove that every continuous piecewise rational
function is in V.
Proposition 3.2 Let u : R→ R be a continuous function that is piecewise
rational. Then u ∈ V.
Proof. Since the function u is piecewise rational, there are −∞ = h1 <
h2 < · · · < hK = ∞ and rational functions
(
Qk
Rk
)K−1
k=0
such that u = Qk
Rk
on
3In fact, the games (Γk)
K−1
k=1
are taken from four games.
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the interval (hk, hk+1), for every k = 1, 2, . . . , K − 1. Assume w.l.o.g. that
for every k = 1, 2, . . . , K − 1 the polynomial Rk is positive on (hk, hk+1),
and denote by εk := inf{Rk(z) : z ∈ (hk, hk+1)} the minimum of Rk in this
interval.
We argue that εk > 0 for every k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1. For k = 2, . . . , K − 2
we have εk > 0 since the interval (hk, hk+1) is bounded and since Rk > 0
on [hk, hk+1]. For k = 1 we have εk > 0 since limz→−∞R1(z) > 0 and since
R1(z) > 0 on (−∞, h1]. For analogous reasons, εK−1 > 0.
By Statement (A.4) of Proposition 3.1 we have max{Rk, εk} ∈ V for every
k = 1, . . . , K−1. By Statements (A.5) and (A.7) of Proposition 3.1 and since
εk > 0 we have
Qk
max{Rk,εk}
∈ V for every k = 1, . . . , K − 1. By iterative use of
Statement (A.6) of Proposition 3.1, we have
K−1∑
k=1
1z∈(hk,hk+1]
Qk
max{Rk, εk}
∈ V.
However, this function is equal to u, and the result follows.
4 Discussion
A linear game is a polynomial game where the payoff in each entry is a linear
function of the parameter Z. The set of value functions of linear games is a
strict subset of V. Indeed, in a linear game the maximal payoff is linear in Z,
hence the value function is bounded by a linear function of Z. In particular,
the function Z2 cannot be the value function of any linear game.
When the domain of the parameter Z is a compact interval I rather than
R, the set VI of value functions of linear games coincides with the restriction
of V to I; that is, the set VI is the set of all continuous and piecewise
rational functions from I to R. The only parts in our proof that do not
carry over to linear games are the proofs of Conditions (A.6) and (A.7).
To see that Condition (A.6) holds for linear games, we note that one can
prove by induction on k that Zk ∈ VI , for every k ∈ N. Instead of proving
Condition (A.7), one can prove by induction on the degree of Q that for
every positive real number ε > 0 and every two polynomials Q and R, the
function Q
max{R,ε}
∈ VI , which is the property that is needed in the proof of
Proposition 3.2.
One example of a linear game that is defined over a compact interval is
a Bayesian game with two states of nature s0 and s1, where the parameter
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Z is the prior probability that the state is s0. Thus, our result implies that
the set of all value functions of Bayesian games with two states of nature is
the set of all continuous piecewise rational functions defined on [0, 1].
A natural question that arises from our study is what happens when the
payoffs depend on two (or more) parameters, say Z and W . In the context
of Bayesian games, this will be equivalent to Bayesian games with more than
two states of nature. In that case, the value function is a function that assigns
a real number to every (Z,W ) ∈ R2. Some parts of our arguments extend
to this case. The difficult step is to prove that Condition (A.6) holds. This
condition turns out to be related to the Pierce-Birkhoff Conjecture, which
asks whether every continuous piecewise polynomial function in Rd is the
maximum of finitely many minima of finitely many polynomials. We leave
the characterization of the set of value functions of polynomial games with
several parameters for future research.
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